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Abstract
The opening of new state schools by non-state actors has intensified debates 
about social selection and inequality in quasi-markets. This article examines the 
case of England, where the government allows anyone to apply to open a new 
‘free school’, arguing this will improve social equity. Using data from the National 
Pupil Database for all 325 free schools established between 2011/12 and 2015/16, 
we analyse whether the students attending free schools are representative of their 
local neighbourhoods. We develop the first analysis of whether the specifics of 
who opens and provides a free school impacts on who attends the school. We also 
analyse whether opening a free school has an impact on neighbouring schools. 
We find that free schools are located in areas with above-average deprivation but 
admit intakes that are more affluent than the average for the neighbourhoods from 
which they recruit. This is particularly the case for primary free schools, which also 
recruit students with above-average prior attainment. There is no evidence that 
free schools become more representative as they admit additional year groups. 
Significantly, we find that all categories of free school providers have opened 
schools whose populations are more affluent than their neighbourhoods, with the 
exception of academy chains. We also find that the opening of a free school leads 
to a concentrated loss of pupils at the closest school, except in cities, but we 
do not identify an impact on the student composition of neighbouring schools. 
Discussing the reasons for this, we conclude that free schools are socially selective 
and reproduce socio-economic inequalities.
Keywords: free schools; academies; school diversity; selection; inequality; 
quasi-markets in education
Introduction
Free schools are part of an ongoing policy agenda to liberalize the ‘supply side’ of 
the school quasi-market in England, by allowing non-state actors to open and govern 
new state schools. Introduced in 2010 by the then coalition government to satisfy a 
Conservative Party manifesto pledge, free schools are established through a unique 
‘demand-led process’ in which potential providers – including ‘teachers, charities, 
parent groups, faith organisations and others’ (DfE, 2010: 58) – are encouraged to 
apply to central government for the right and state funding to set up a new school. 
Free schools can be opened without local demographic need for new school places, 
where there is evidence of ‘parental demand’ (though critics have raised objections 
concerning the evidence required to demonstrate parental demand in the application 
process; see National Audit Office (2013: 7) and McInerney (2016: 1)). The Conservative 
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governments elected in 2015 and 2017 have committed to increasing the number of 
free schools, with the aim to open 900 by 2020 (DfE, 2015), arguing that free schools 
will increase parental choice, create new competitive pressure on existing schools and 
contribute to greater equity, not least because the people and organizations opening 
free schools would be ‘motivated by the desire to make a difference in disadvantaged 
areas’ (DfE, 2010: 59). Five years on, following the opening of the first five waves of 
free schools, Nicky Morgan, the then Secretary of State for Education, argued that 
‘Free schools are the “modern engines of social justice” helping “break the cycle of 
disadvantage”’ (DfE, 2015: 1).
Despite these policy claims, there is widespread concern that free schools will 
exacerbate social selection (NUT, 2013; Stokes, 2014) and reproduce social inequality 
(Coldron et al., 2009). Social selection by socio-economic status has been found to 
reduce the educational and occupational aspirations of disadvantaged students 
(Gorard and Smith, 2008). In countries where there is greater socio-economic 
segregation between schools, there are wider inequalities in student outcomes by 
socio-economic status and no beneficial effect on average student attainment (OECD, 
2003). While free schools are not allowed to select students by ability, they could 
become socially selective in a number of ways. Free schools with a faith designation 
are allowed to select half of their students using faith criteria. Parents opening free 
schools can prioritize the admission of their own children. All free schools are able to 
determine their own admission policies, within the constraints of a national admissions 
code (DfE, 2014). This allows schools to create prioritized catchment areas (instead of 
using a simple distance measure) as an oversubscription criterion and to select 10 per 
cent of their students by aptitude, determined by a test, in specific subject specialisms 
(performing arts (including music), visual arts, modern foreign languages, sport, design 
and technology and information technology) (DfE, 2014b). Perhaps most significantly, 
the people and organizations opening free schools can choose to locate their schools 
in more advantaged areas or develop a school ethos and curriculum that proves more 
attractive to particular parents, including by socio-economic class and/or ethnicity 
(Hatcher, 2011; Walford, 2014; Higham, 2014a). 
These concerns regarding social selection were partly borne out by two early 
analyses of free school intakes, which used fairly small amounts of data concerning the 
first three waves of openings. Green et al. (2015: 921) found that while free schools had 
in fact been located in areas of ‘somewhat above average disadvantage’, they admitted 
fewer pupils eligible for free school meals than did neighbouring schools. Morris (2015: 
1) reported that, while Wave 1 free schools ‘underrepresented poorer children every 
year’, Waves 2 and 3 provided ‘a more mixed picture’. Both studies argued for further 
research into free school student composition, and there is a number of compelling 
reasons for doing so now. First, the intakes of free schools may be changing over time, 
both as new annual waves are established and as earlier waves admit new year groups. 
There is preliminary evidence, for instance, that the longer a free school is open the 
greater the likelihood that local parents and pupils express a preference to attend it 
(EPI, 2017). Second, there is no evidence to date on whether there is an impact on 
student intake from who opens a free school. This is despite evidence that the profile 
of those who open free schools is changing over time (Higham, 2017). 
Drawing on admissions data from the 325 free schools opened in the first 
five annual waves between 2011/12 and 2015/16, this paper develops the following 
analysis. First, to investigate whether free schools are socially selective, we analyse 
which students attend free schools and whether they are representative of the 
neighbourhoods from which free schools recruit, in terms of socio-economic status, 
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ethnicity and prior attainment. Where possible we employ a methodological approach 
similar to Green et al.’s (2015) to enable comparison. Second, to consider the influence 
of the non-state actors who have opened free schools, we analyse whether the profile 
of those who open a particular free school is associated with whether that free school 
is socially selective or not. We refer to the actors opening free schools as ‘school 
providers’, reflecting the government’s policy on ‘liberalizing the supply side’ of the 
school quasi-market. This includes policy aims to roll back local government from school 
governance and to make who provides state schools ‘contestable’, which concerns 
both the opening of new schools by non-state actors and ‘creating the possibility that 
new providers can be brought in to replace those who are not performing adequately 
in running a service’ (IPPR, 2001: 44). Third, to examine the wider intended aims of free 
school policy on competition, we analyse whether the opening of a free school has a 
discernible impact on neighbouring schools in terms of the number and composition 
of the student populations they admit. 
Social selection in school quasi-markets
The current policy framework for school quasi-markets in England has origins in the 
1988 Education Reform Act (ERA). The ERA introduced open enrolment and per capita 
funding to place schools more directly into competition with one another. Schools 
received greater control over finance and an option to opt out of local authority 
governance. City Technology Colleges (CTCs) enabled businesses to open secondary 
schools with support from central government. Although only 15 CTCs opened, the 
ERA (1998: 110) allowed the Secretary of State for Education to ‘enter into an agreement 
with any person’ to open a CTC, and this now provides the legal basis for opening free 
schools (the 2010 Academies Act having modified the wording of the 1998 Act to allow 
the Secretary of State for Education ‘to enter into Academy arrangements with any 
person’, with free schools having the same legal status as academies (Wolfe, 2011), see 
below). The overall logic of the ERA was that choice and competition would develop 
incentives for institutional diversity and improvement, and that inequalities would 
reduce as disadvantaged families gained more choice and unpopular schools faced 
the threat of closure. Since 1988, successive attempts have been made to achieve 
these aims. Demand-side reforms have seen the government appoint choice advisors 
to support low-income families in making school choices (Exley, 2013) as well as ever 
more school performance data for parents (Ozga, 2009). Supply-side reforms have 
sought to promote institutional diversity by allowing existing schools to convert to 
new statuses (e.g. convertor academies) and non-state actors to take over existing 
schools where they are judged to be ‘inadequate’ or ‘coasting’ (e.g. as sponsored 
academies). Academies are schools that are legally independent of local authorities 
and sign a funding agreement directly with central government. They are operated 
by academy trusts, which have the legal basis of companies limited by guarantee 
with charitable status. In December 2017 there were 2,009 sponsored academies and 
4,890 convertor academies in England, compared with just over 20,000 mainstream, 
maintained state schools.
Despite the dominance of these ideas there is little evidence to support the 
claim that choice and competition lead to improvement (Whitty, 2008). Rather, there 
is evidence that segregation can increase. Analysing primary schools in London, for 
instance, Gibbons et al. (2006: 9) found that segregation increased as competition 
intensified, both by socio-economic status and ‘with high- and low-ability pupils more 
segregated in schools that face more competition’. Waslander et al. (2010) argue that 
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competition may need to exceed a certain threshold before schools respond to it. 
When they do, external responses such as marketing, public relations exercises and 
covert selection are to be expected as schools seek to control the size and composition 
of their student body. Schools may also try to shape enrolment by making internal 
changes such as introducing student tracking systems and/or (extra-)curricular options 
that appeal to particular parents. These responses interact with parental choice, which 
often includes middle-class strategies to ‘escape from class “others”’ (Ball, 2013: 16), 
but also wider class and ethnic solidarities, where for instance poorer parents may also 
choose schools that reproduce social ties over higher-attaining alternatives (Burgess 
et al., 2015). One consequence is that schools are commonly organized into local status 
hierarchies. As school status is closely related to student population composition, this 
creates incentives for social selection (van Zanten, 2009).
The interaction of choice and competition varies locally, however, and is one of a 
range of influences on social segregation. Government policies on school accountability 
(which often dovetail quasi-market reforms) influence social selection (Woods et al., 
1998). Residential patterns around schools reflect deeper, historical socio-economic 
class inequalities (Simon, 1999). Trends in any one indicator of segregation are also 
influenced by national changes in the student population measured by that indicator 
– where this alters student distribution across schools. Gorard et al. (2013) argue, for 
example, that since eligibility for free school meals (FSMs) is influenced by economic 
up- and downturns, when the economy worsens FSM segregation is likely to decrease 
as more families will be officially living in poverty and this may well spread FSM eligibility 
across more schools. Gorard et al. (2013) argue that these population changes have a 
significant influence on national measures of socio-economic segregation.
A consistent school-level finding, however, is that specific forms of institutional 
diversity are associated with social selection. Allen (2007) reports that in most parts 
of England secondary schools are more segregated than their neighbourhoods, but 
that this is most pronounced where more students attend grammar, voluntary aided or 
foundation schools. Grammar schools select students by attainment, voluntary aided 
schools by (mainly Catholic) faith and foundation schools act as their own admission 
authorities. Coldron (2015) argues that schools that act as admission authorities are 
more likely to use complex admission criteria, uneven banding and/or be reluctant 
to accept hard to place children. New regulations in 1998 sought to reduce these 
practices by requiring schools to comply with an admissions code, which to some 
extent reduced social stratification across schools (Allen et al., 2012). The code was, 
however, weakened from 2010, alongside a rapid increase in the number of schools that 
are academies, which also act as their own admission authorities (Coldron, 2015). While 
the early (pre-2006) sponsored academies often replaced disadvantaged schools, the 
majority of (post-2010) academies are convertor academies that admit on average 
markedly fewer students eligible for FSMs than the national average. For Gorard et al. 
(2013: 193), this confirms that state-funded school diversity ‘is almost inevitably a cause 
of further segregation’.
A key question is whether free schools will conform to these trends. Waslander et al. 
(2010) argue for a distinction between new ‘start-ups’, such as free schools, and existing 
schools that change status in response to diversity reforms. Neoclassical economic 
theory, Waslander et al. suggest, assumes that start-ups will help quasi-markets work 
more equitably by allowing entry for non-state actors committed to equity goals and/
or by stimulating choice and competition, particularly where start-ups are allowed to 
create or add to an over-supply of places. Evidence from two countries where start-ups 
opened during the 1990s does not, however, provide support for these assumptions. 
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In Sweden, Wiborg (2010) argues, ‘free schools’ increased socio-economic and racial 
segregation, including by being overrepresented in urban, affluent and gentrifying 
localities. In America, different states have different policies. Logan and Burdick-Will 
(2015) report that charter schools have increased racial segregation in Philadelphia and 
Texas but may have reduced it in Chicago. Lubienski et al. (2009) report that in Detroit, 
Washington, DC and New Orleans, even when the stated mission was to serve poorer 
students, both for-profit and (over time) not-for-profit charter schools tended to adopt 
locations on the outer edges of poorer areas, to try to attract more aspirational parents. 
Waslander et al. (2010: 57) conclude that, while there is limited evidence across the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in practice start-
ups often choose locations strategically to be ‘close to “desirable” pupil populations’. 
However, policy rules and regulations, they argue, could be used to ‘provide incentives 
to tone down or even reverse these preferences’. 
In England, there are no decisive rules on location. Free schools can open in 
response to ‘parental demand’ rather than demographic need for places alone, and 
so can in principle create or contribute to an over-supply of places. In practice it is 
unclear what proportion of free schools have opened in areas of need or over-supply. 
After being found to have used funds ring-fenced for urgently needed new places to 
build free schools in areas without need, the government committed to publish the 
proportion of free schools opening in or adjacent to areas of forecasted need. Across 
the first five waves, the DfE (2014) projected this would exceed 75 per cent. As the 
NAHT (2016: 1) argued, however, the creation of a free school satisfying this measure 
is ‘not the same as a coordinated and measured approach … to create school places 
exactly where they are needed’. 
There is a specific application process, run and determined by central government 
alone, through which free schools have to be opened. Anyone can apply, although 
free schools cannot be run directly for profit, to preach hatred or teach creationism 
as science. To apply, proposers have to set out an educational vision, curriculum 
and staffing plans, provide evidence of parental demand and detail their capability 
to establish and govern a school. Once open, free schools are legally the same as 
academies and so independent of local government. Free schools receive initial start-
up funds, but then the same recurrent funding as other state-funded schools. They 
are held accountable by central government against the same inspection framework 
and performance indicators as other schools. There is no single official definition or 
explanation of the word ‘free’ in ‘free school’. In part this word is borrowed from Swedish 
free schools (Friskolar) policy, although there are significant differences between the 
Swedish and English policies (Wiborg, 2015). In English policy texts, ‘free’ is associate 
with the fact that free schools ‘aren’t run by the local council. They have more control 
over how they do things’ (DfE, 2017: 1). 
In this context, this article addresses three research questions. First, are 
students attending the first five waves of free schools representative of their local 
neighbourhoods? Second, is who provides a free school associated with whether free 
schools are socially selective or not? Third, does the opening of a free school have a 
discernible impact on neighbouring schools, in terms of their number or composition 
of students?
Method to analyse free schools
To develop this analysis we take data from the National Pupil Database (NPD) for 
England, a termly census of all pupils in state-funded schools containing basic 
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demographic and attainment information. We analyse the standard age 4 (Year 
R – reception year) and age 11 (Year 7) intakes into primary and secondary schools, 
respectively, for the years 2011/12, 2012/13, 2013/14, 2014/15 and 2015/16. This allows 
us to study the intake patterns for the cohorts of pupils attending the free schools that 
opened in September 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015.
Our analysis also uses data from the School Capacity Survey (SCAP), a statutory 
annual survey through which the Department for Education collects data from local 
authorities on the number of places in and the number of pupils admitted into all 
state-funded schools. We look, again, at the standard admission years (Years R and 7) in 
2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. This allows us to study the number of students admitted by 
free schools in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 and compare this to each school’s published 
maximum Pupil Admission Number. The 2016 SCAP data had not been released at 
the time of this analysis, which means we could not conduct this analysis for Wave 5 
free schools.
To develop this analysis in relation to our first research question, we calculate 
three indicators of demographic profile for every school and neighbourhood in 
England, following Green et al. (2015). The first indicator is the percentage of 
students eligible for FSM, which we use as a proxy for socio-economic disadvantage. 
While we acknowledge the weakness of this proxy in some respects (see Hobbs and 
Vignoles, 2010), and recognize that socio-economic disadvantage is influenced by 
the intersection of a range of factors, including ‘income, parents’ education, social 
class, marginalisation and negative segregation’ (Cederberg et al., 2009: 12), recent 
government analysis shows that FSM eligibility at least is strongly associated with 
students who make poor progress at school (Allen, 2017). The second indicator is the 
percentage of students of white British ethnic background, which we use as a proxy 
for ethnic diversity. The third indicator is prior attainment. For primary schools, we 
use the mean score on the Foundation Stage Profile (FSP) of the Year R intake. For 
secondary schools, we use the mean Key Stage 2 (KS2) scores of the Year 7 intake. 
In both cases we standardize the scores for each cohort to give a mean of zero and 
standard deviation of one. 
In order to measure the demographic profile of the neighbourhoods in which 
free schools have been set up, we must also define neighbourhoods around schools. 
We again follow Green et al. (2015) by assigning a lower layer super output area 
(LSOA; a geographical area with an average population of 1,500 people, defined at 
the national level by the Office for National Statistics) to a free school’s recruitment 
neighbourhood if one child who lives there currently or previously attended the 
free school. As Allen and Burgess (2013) have shown, using this approach allows 
the recruitment neighbourhood of a school to comprise irregular and even non-
contiguous spaces, if that is how historically recruitment has taken place. Using one 
student admitted to a free school from a LSOA is a low threshold, so we performed a 
sensitivity analysis in Table 3 (below) by raising the threshold to two pupils. We found 
that this did not change the analytical inference. Specifically, on FSM eligibility there 
was never more than a two-percentage-point change in the neighbourhood profile, 
and all cohort-years (of which there are 30 in the table across secondary and primary 
schools) continue to show that the neighbourhood FSM eligibility is higher than the 
free school’s. On prior attainment, there was never more than a 0.04 s.d. change in the 
neighbourhood profile. There was also little change in the frequency with which free 
schools are reported to have higher-attaining intakes: 25 out of 30 using two students 
per LSOA, versus 27 out of 30 using one per LSOA.
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To analyse who provides free schools, our second research question, we develop 
a categorization of the individuals and organizations that govern all 325 free schools 
in Waves 1 to 5. To determine which category a free school is assigned to, we use data 
on who originally proposed the school and on who serve as members and directors of 
the resulting free school trust (who have the right to appoint the majority of governors) 
– most commonly the original proposers and current trust members are one and the 
same, though in a small number of cases free schools have been closed by government, 
due to financial irregularities or an ‘inadequate’ Ofsted inspection, and then often 
reopened by a new provider. Our analysis uses data on who was providing the schools 
in December 2016, generated from a review of each provider’s online presence, local 
media and documents published by the DfE, the local authority and the New Schools 
Network, a charity that aims (with government support) to help proposers develop 
applications. This analysis triangulated a minimum of three documentary sources 
for each school. This follows the approach employed by Higham (2014a) to analyse 
the providers of free schools opened in the first three waves (see Higham (2014a) 
for a detailed discussion of the characteristics of each resulting free school provider 
category).
Since the opening of free schools is not random, we face difficulties in measuring 
their impact on neighbouring schools, our third research question. Our estimation 
approach involves drawing data from as far back as 2008/09, i.e. before the launch of 
the free schools programme, to measure both levels and historical changes in school 
intakes at all schools across the country. We then use the more recent data, up to 
2015/16, to measure how much intakes at schools neighbouring free schools change 
after they open, compared to all other changes in intakes across the country. This is 
known as a difference-in-difference estimation approach, because each neighbouring 
school’s pupil roll and FSM proportion is compared to both their historical figures and 
changes at schools in areas where free schools did not open. In these school panel 
data regressions, following Green et al. (2015), a school fixed-effect dummy accounts 
for starting points in the size and composition of schools, time dummy variables 
account for national trends in pupil roll sizes and FSM take-up, and we also control for 
changes in deprivation and pupil population at a more local level. (This is generally at 
the local authority level, though we group together very small local authorities such as 
those in London.)
Findings
We set out the findings of the analysis by first outlining several key characteristics of 
the free schools that opened in Waves 1 to 5. We then examine who attends mainstream 
free schools, including who has provided them, before considering whether free 
schools have a discernible impact on neighbouring schools.
In Table 1 we count the number of free schools that opened in the first five 
waves by provider category. Of the 325 free schools to open, 146 were primary schools, 
111 secondary schools and 68 were non-mainstream ‘other’ free schools. ‘Other’ free 
schools include special, alternative provision and 16–19 free schools, which have been 
opened by state schools and charities in particular. We note that we do not include 
‘other’ free schools in our subsequent analysis, which focuses on mainstream schools.
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Table 1: Number of free schools by provider category (Waves 1 to 5)
Year R intake Year 7 intake Other
N % of total N % of total N % of total
Academy chain 30 21 9 8 7 10
Charity 12 8 2 2 17 25
Faith group 33 23 20 18 2 3
FE/HE 9 6 4 4 2 3
Independent school 12 8 9 8 2 3
Parents 15 10 22 20 4 6
Sponsored 4 3 14 13 0 0
State school 20 14 17 15 30 44
Teacher 11 8 14 13 4 6
Total 146 100 111 100 68 100
Notes: (i) The figures include all free schools as well as those that have since closed. In the ‘other’ 
category we include special schools, alternative provision and 16–19 free schools. Throughout 
this article we do not treat studio schools or university technical colleges as free schools. 
(ii) ‘FE/HE’ indicates providers operating further education or higher education institutions. 
‘Sponsored’ free schools are the result of a parent or community group asking a separate 
organization to propose – or sponsor – a free school on their behalf. The governance of the 
free school is usually controlled by the sponsor, but is sometimes shared with the local group. 
To date, sponsored free schools have most commonly been opened by educational services 
organizations (Higham, 2014a).
(iii) We differentiate between academy chains, which are groups of schools controlled by private 
not-for-profit companies, including philanthropists and educational consultancies, which hold 
similarities to charitable management organizations in the USA (Glatter, 2017), and state 
schools, which typically involve a single existing school opening a free school in the same or 
different phase, or an existing consortium of schools working to open a free school collectively. 
In practice, both academy chains and state schools use the legal vehicle of a multi-academy 
trust to open free schools. We have chosen to retain this differentiation following Higham 
(2014a), however, as it recognizes an empirical difference in who governs free schools.
There have been changes in the balance of provider categories over the first five 
waves of free schools. In the first wave of opening, the majority of providers could be 
classified as belonging to ‘civil society’ (i.e. parent, teacher, faith or charity groups). By 
the last wave we analyse (2015 openings) that the majority of providers were existing 
educational institutions (i.e. state schools, academy chains, independent schools 
and FE/HE institutions – see Higham (2014a) for a discussion of the reasons for and 
implications of these changes.) Overall, to date, free schools have been opened most 
frequently by existing state schools, faith groups, parents and academy chains.
Over a fifth of mainstream free schools have chosen to have a religious 
designation. Figure 1 shows that free schools are not more religious than existing state 
schools, but the type of religious designation is materially different. Existing state 
schools are overwhelmingly Anglican or Roman Catholic, reflecting the historical role 
of the Church of England and the Catholic Church in opening and maintaining schools 
(Lawson and Silver, 1973). By contrast, a majority of free schools are being set up to 
serve other Christian and other religious communities, including the Jewish, Muslim 
and Hindu faiths. We note that the Conservative government announced plans in 2016 
to end the restriction whereby faith free schools can designate a maximum of 50 per 
cent of places for students who fulfil faith requirements. This may influence the balance 
of faith free schools in the future, including as the Roman Catholic Church has been 
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unwilling to open new schools under the 50 per cent restriction, as it expects Catholic 
schools to give first priority to Catholic applicants (Catholic Diocese of Southwark, 2015). 
Figure 1: Religious denomination of free schools
In terms of the size of student intake in free schools, Figures 2 and 3 show the pupil roll 
for each of the five waves of free schools in secondary and primary schools respectively. 
In both cases, across the first five waves, the size of the programme peaked at Wave 3 
(the 2013/14 cohort). For each wave of openings, the pupil roll was somewhat smaller 
in its first year than it was in subsequent years. This is particularly the case for secondary 
school openings.
Figure 2: Pupil roll at free schools by year of opening (secondary schools)
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Figure 3: Pupil roll at free schools by year of opening (primary schools)
We can also compare the size of the pupil roll in Year 7 (the admission year for secondary 
schools) and Year R (the reception admission year for primary schools) to each school’s 
published admission number. This allows us to observe how successful free schools are 
in filling their places each year after opening. We note that this data was not available 
for the 2015/16 wave at the time of the analysis. Figure 4 reveals that secondary free 
schools in the 2012, 2013 and 2014 cohorts typically filled less than three-quarters of 
their spaces in their first years of opening. Figure 5 shows that primary free schools 
were more likely to be full or nearly full on opening, except for the 2014 cohort of free 
schools. Across both phases, the first wave of 24 free schools that opened in 2011 was 
notably more successful in attracting students than each subsequent wave.
Figure 4: Percentage of spaces filled in Year 7
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Figure 5: Percentage of spaces filled in Year R
We also found that the category of the free school provider was associated with whether 
free schools were successfully filling their intake places (available from authors). Free 
schools set up by teachers, state schools and independent schools generally have full 
cohorts by the second year after opening. By contrast, about half of those opened 
by academy chains, charities or faith groups still fail to fill half of their places in their 
second intake cohort.
We now analyse the student intake of free schools. We compare the social, ethnic 
and attainment profile of free schools to their neighbourhoods and to England as a 
whole. As discussed in the method section, we define a neighbourhood as all LSOAs 
where at least one child attends a free school in that year. The reach of free schools 
across England is now considerable: 15 per cent of LSOAs now have at least one Year 7 
pupil going to a secondary free school, and the equivalent figure for Year R in primary 
free schools is 11 per cent. We can observe no evidence that as a free school matures, 
the number of recruitment neighbourhoods falls. We can observe, however, a clear 
phase difference in whether free schools recruit from a wider area than the national 
average for state schools. As Table 2 sets out, we do this by distinguishing between free 
schools opened in more rural areas, towns and cities, so as to account for population 
density. For the Year 7 intake into secondary schools, we find no evidence that free 
schools are recruiting from a wider area in comparison to the national average. For 
the Year R intake into primary schools, however, we find that free schools are recruiting 
from a wider than average area.
Table 2: Number of LSOAs from which free schools recruit
Year R intake Year 7 intake
Free schools National average Free schools National average
Rural area 12 6 28 29
Town 23 13 40 44
City 23 17 52 64
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In terms of student composition, Table 3 shows free schools’ intake and free schools’ 
recruitment neighbourhood statistics for FSM eligibility, the proportion of white British 
students and the mean prior attainment at intake. Both primary and secondary free 
schools have opened in areas of higher than average ethnic diversity, with a substantially 
lower proportion than the national average of students who are white British. Across all 
waves, the percentage of free school pupils who are white British is broadly similar to 
the recruitment neighbourhood.
In terms of prior attainment, we find that both primary and secondary free schools 
are located in areas with a lower attainment profile than the national average. However, 
the foundation stage profile recorded at Year R in primary schools shows that primary 
free schools have had higher-attaining intakes than their recruitment neighbourhoods 
in all five waves of openings. The first wave of secondary free schools also had intakes 
that were attaining higher than their recruitment neighbourhoods, but this has not 
been true for subsequent waves of secondary free schools. 
The proportion of FSM-eligible students at free schools is further illustrated in 
Figures 6 (secondary school) and 7 (primary school). The patterns need to be interpreted 
against the background of falling FSM eligibility nationally (light grey line), as the economy 
began to recover after the 2008 financial crash, but also in relation to changes in benefit 
rules under public sector austerity. Overall, free schools have had a lower proportion 
of FSM eligibility than their recruitment neighbourhoods in every year of every wave. 
The one exception is secondary free schools in the third year of Wave 3, where the FSM 
proportion was the same as their neighbourhoods. Primary free schools in particular 
are more affluent than their recruitment neighbourhoods and this is especially the case 
in the first and third waves (2011 and 2013 cohorts). It is also true that secondary free 
schools are more affluent than their recruitment neighbourhoods, but this difference is 
more significant for the first wave of free schools (2011 cohort) than it has been for more 
recent waves. When compared to the wider decline in FSM eligibility both nationally and 
in their recruitment neighbourhoods, there is no evidence that in the years after opening 
free schools either decrease or increase their percentage of FSM eligible students.
Figure 6: Pupils eligible for FSM at secondary free schools in Year 7 compared to 
their neighbourhoods 
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Figure 7: Pupils eligible for FSM at primary free schools in Year R compared to their 
neighbourhoods 
We also analyse student FSM eligibility by free school provider category. Figures 8 
and 9 show how the free school and neighbourhood FSM eligibility proportions 
compare for each provider category. For primary schools, it is notable that all provider 
categories have set up free schools that are more affluent than their neighbourhoods, 
except for those set up by academy chains. For secondary schools, it is again the case 
that all provider categories have set up free schools that are more affluent than their 
neighbourhoods, except for charities and academy chains. The differences in FSM 
eligibility are again smaller for secondary than primary free schools, and it is only those 
secondary free schools provided by independent schools that have a significantly 
lower FSM proportions than their neighbourhoods. It is also important to note that the 
number of schools in some of these categories is very small (see Table 1), so inferences 
about how provider category is associated with composition of pupil intakes need 
to be treated carefully. This is particularly the case for secondary schools opened by 
charities, for which there are only two cases.
We also look at the direct impact of free schools on the size and social profile of 
their nearest neighbouring schools. We do this in a panel data regression that models 
changes in the number of pupils and in the FSM proportion for each non-free school 
from 2008/09 onwards. As described, we use wider area control variables to account 
for any underlying demographic changes in the area.
The first column of estimates in Table 4 reports how the opening of a primary 
free school is associated with changes in pupil roll at the nearest school, the next 
two nearest, fourth to sixth nearest and the seventh to tenth nearest. We distinguish 
again between free schools opening in cities, towns and more rural areas. In more rural 
areas, the opening of a primary free school is associated with a fall of 5.4 pupils in the 
Year R intake at the nearest school. It is also associated with a fall of 3–4 pupils at other 
neighbouring schools that are not the nearest. We can observe no impact on pupil 
rolls in towns and cities. 
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Figure 8: FSM proportions by provider category (Year 7)
Figure 9: FSM proportions by provider category (Year R)
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The third column of estimates reports how the opening of a secondary free school is 
associated with changes in pupil roll in neighbouring schools. In more rural areas, the 
opening of a secondary free school is associated with a fall of 16 pupils (i.e. half a form 
class) in the Year 7 roll at the nearest school, with no discernible impact on schools 
further away. In towns, a free school is also associated with a fall of 16 pupils at the 
nearest school, with other neighbouring schools losing 2 to 3 students. In cities we do 
not identify an impact on the closest secondary school. We can observe, however, that 
other neighbouring schools in the city lose between 4 and 7 pupils after the opening of 
a secondary free school. Finally, the second and fourth columns of estimates show that 
the opening of a free school is not associated with a material change in the proportion 
of students eligible for FSMs in neighbouring schools. 
Discussion
In the context of quasi-market supply-side liberalization reforms in England, we have 
presented new data on ‘start-up’ schools (Waslander et al., 2009). Previously, new 
schools in England have nearly always opened in response to demographic need, and 
there have been few examples of wholly new ‘start-up’ schools set up independently 
of local government. By contrast, the aim of free schools policy is to allow non-state 
actors to open and govern state-funded ‘start-up’ schools, without requiring evidence 
of demographic need for new places. 
Our first research question asked whether students attending the first five waves 
of free schools are representative of their local neighbourhoods. We have shown that 
free schools have developed recruitment neighbourhoods that are above average 
in terms of deprivation and have higher than average ethnic diversity. We have also 
shown, however, that free schools do not admit a representative proportion of students 
eligible for FSMs. Free schools do have a similar proportion of students who are white 
British to their recruitment neighbourhood, but their intake is more affluent.
These findings are broadly consistent with two earlier studies of the first three 
waves of free schools. As we have shown, this is because free schools have not 
become more locally representative as they have admitted additional year groups and 
because later waves of free schools have continued to be more affluent than their 
local neighbourhoods. Morris (2015) for instance argued that the first wave of free 
schools ‘underrepresented poorer children’ but Waves 2 and 3 provided ‘a more mixed 
picture’. It is true that secondary free schools in Wave 3 were then (in their first year) 
and have continued to be the most inclusive free schools to date, but this has not been 
replicated in Waves 4 and 5. We have also shown that there is an important difference 
between primary and secondary free schools. Primary schools are notably more affluent 
and have a higher prior attainment profile than their recruitment neighbourhoods. 
Secondary free schools are also more affluent than their recruitment neighbourhoods, 
but this is more significant for the first wave of free schools than it has been for more 
recent waves.
Our second research question asked whether who provides free schools 
influences whether free schools are socially selective or not. There has been a range 
of concern about parents in particular setting up their own free schools with, as Boffey 
(2011: 1) reported, arguments that free schools will be: ‘established by ‘sharp-elbowed, 
well-off parents’ in affluent areas for middle-class children’. Our analysis shows that 
parents have indeed set up free schools that are unrepresentative of their recruitment 
neighbourhoods. However, rather than parents in particular, it is in fact free schools set 
up by all categories of provider that are socially selective in terms of FSM eligibility, 
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with the exception of academy chains (and two charity providers in the secondary 
phase). There is again a difference between providers of secondary schools, who 
tend to have opened schools that are less socially selective, and providers of primary 
schools whose schools are notably more affluent in terms of FSM eligibility (expect for 
academy chains). 
There are several potential reasons for this recurring phase difference. The aims of 
secondary free school providers could be different to those operating primary schools, 
with for instance greater interest in serving disadvantaged communities. However, 
given the consistency of phase differences across all provider categories (except for 
charities), it is likely that different or additional factors are at work. Student recruitment 
for example into secondary free schools may be different to primaries, for which we 
have some evidence. We have shown secondary free schools are less likely to be full, 
which means primary schools are more likely to have used oversubscription policies 
and less able (regardless of willingness) to admit mid-year admissions, including of 
hard to place students. We have also shown that whereas secondaries free schools 
do not recruit across a greater number of LSOAs than schools on average, primary 
free schools do, which means they have attracted parents willing to travel further to 
schools. Nationally, students eligible for FSMs travel less far to schools than do non-
FSM-eligible students, including when distance to the nearest school is controlled 
for (DCSF, 2008: 111). Both these findings suggest student recruitment has been 
empirically different in primary and secondary free schools.
In this context, the case of academy chains is intriguing. The majority of free 
schools opened by academy chains (30/39) are primary schools, but they do not conform 
to the wider trends by phase. Rather, primary free schools provided by academy chains 
are representative of their local neighbourhoods in terms of FSM eligibility. Further, half 
of academy chains still fail to fill half of their places in their second intake cohort. This is 
despite significant contemporary demand for primary school places and claims by the 
think-tank Policy Exchange (Porter and Simons, 2015: 40–41) that academy chains are 
most likely to set up free schools in areas of basic need for new places. Clearly there is 
a need for further research here, which we discuss below.
Our third research question asked whether the opening of a free school had 
a discernible impact on neighbouring schools. We have analysed the number of 
students admitted into neighbouring schools and found an impact on, specifically, 
the nearest primary schools in rural areas and the nearest secondary schools in rural 
areas and towns, which were shown to lose half a class of students. There was also 
a smaller impact on neighbouring (but not the nearest) secondary schools in cities, 
suggesting the impact is more dispersed in cities, potentially as a result of greater 
population density. In comparison to Green et al. (2015) – who have found no impact 
from free schools on student rolls, except with third-wave secondary schools – our 
findings suggest that the impact may have increased over time, but since we used a 
refined measure of population density, we have not made a direct comparison. 
We have also analysed the student composition of neighbouring schools in 
terms of FSM eligibility but found no evidence of impact. Our findings are consistent 
here with Green et al. (2015), showing that the lack of impact on FSM eligibility in 
neighbouring schools has continued as early waves admitted further years of entry. 
This finding does not rule out individual free schools having a significant compositional 
impact on one or more neighbouring school, but there is at present no discernible 
impact from free schools overall. As Green et al. noted, this lack of compositional 
impact is an interesting finding to set next to the observation that free schools admit 
intakes that are more affluent than their neighbourhoods. This may be because, as we 
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have shown, primary free schools recruit over a wider area and/or because a significant 
proportion of secondary free schools are not full, but further analysis is needed. 
It is useful, finally, to consider these findings in relation to three common 
arguments about why free schools may be socially selective, so as to also highlight areas 
for further research. The first is school location. Waslander et al. (2009: 57) conclude 
that ‘start-up’ schools tend to locate strategically so as to be ‘close to ‘desirable’ 
pupil populations’. Our analysis suggests that this may not have occurred to the same 
extent in England, as free schools have developed recruitment neighbourhoods with 
above-average deprivation and higher than average ethnic diversity. Identifying school 
sites has also been reported as a common challenge for providers, so there may have 
been fewer possibilities for strategic choice of location, particularly in London where 
building density and prices are constraining factors (NAO, 2013). A more detailed 
analysis of location is needed, however. This might usefully analyse whether (and if so 
how) school location influences the socio-economic geography of student recruitment. 
We also need a closer analysis of where free schools have created or extended an over-
supply of places and where they have met a need for new places, as this may be an 
important influence on social selection. 
The second thematic area is provider category. Higham (2014b) has critiqued the 
government application process, arguing that it risks diverting resources to advantaged 
actors. Our research has shown that all categories of providers are socially selective in 
terms of FSM eligibility (except for academy chains) and this appears to offer support 
to Higham’s argument that actors who really want (in the words of the government) ‘to 
make a difference in disadvantaged areas’ have found it difficult to gain government 
approval for their application (DfE, 2010: 59). Further research on providers’ aims is 
clearly needed here, however. This might seek to understand the extent to which social 
selection is intentional or not, or – as we recognized the challenge of undertaking 
such research – whether providers who have evidently taken local equity and inclusion 
seriously fare better in recruiting intakes that are locally representative.
The third thematic area is school admissions in the context of parental choice. 
There has been concern that free schools’ admission policies will be socially selective, 
even where they adhere to the 2012 Admissions Code (Morris, 2014; Stokes, 2014). 
This adds further weight to the argument that schools should not be allowed to 
become their own admissions authorities (Coldron, 2015). Further research on local 
admissions and parental choice is needed, however. This might analyse, for instance, 
whether specific types of free schools are more or less attractive to particular groups 
of parents, including in terms of the educational aims of free schools. We also need a 
closer analysis of parents’ socio-economic status and ethnicity – as a limitation of this 
article is that we have used FSM eligibility and percentage of students that are white 
British as proxies.
Conclusion
We have shown that free schools that opened in the first five annual waves, between 
2011/12 and 2015/16, have been socially selective in terms of students’ social economic 
status. Located in areas of above-average deprivation and substantially above-average 
ethnic diversity, free schools have admitted a representative proportion of local students 
who are white British, but their intakes are more affluent than the neighbourhoods 
from which they recruit. We have shown that this is particularly the case for primary 
free schools, which also recruit students with above-average prior attainment. There is 
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also no evidence that as free schools admit additional year groups, they become more 
representative of their neighbourhoods.
We have also developed the first analysis of whether the profile of the provider 
of a free school impacts on who attends the school. We have shown that it is not only 
parent-led free schools but also all categories of providers that have opened schools 
that are more affluent than their neighbourhoods, with the exception of academy 
chains. This highlights the persistence of social selection. We cannot comment from 
our data on whether this social selection was intentional or otherwise on the part of 
free school founders. We can, however, state that, in terms of the intakes of the first 
five annual waves, free schools in England join a growing list of market-based school 
diversity reforms that reproduce socio-economic inequalities through social selection. 
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